-- Community moderation (Phase 1): reports, bans/timeouts, audit actions.
--
-- Design: PLANS/COMMUNITY_MODERATION_PLAN.md §0 (decisions locked by Tyler,
-- 2026-07-07). All three tables are tenant-scoped: community_id NOT NULL and
-- community-id-leading keys, per the tenant-isolation lints in
-- crates/buzz-db/src/migration.rs. Report/ban targets are only ever resolved
-- under the requesting TenantContext — no global lookups (MOD invariants,
-- docs/spec/MultiTenantRelay.tla).

-- ── NIP-56 reports (kind:1984 ingest) ─────────────────────────────────────────
-- One row per accepted report event. Reports are signals, never triggers:
-- nothing auto-actions on them (NIP-56). Reporter identity is visible to
-- moderators in the queue but never revealed to the reported author.

CREATE TABLE moderation_reports (
    community_id        UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
    id                  UUID NOT NULL DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
    -- The signed kind:1984 event id (stored for audit/idempotency).
    report_event_id     BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (length(report_event_id) = 32),
    reporter_pubkey     BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (length(reporter_pubkey) = 32),
    -- What was reported. Exactly one target class per row (CHECK-enforced below).
    target_kind         TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (target_kind IN ('event', 'pubkey', 'blob')),
    target_event_id     BYTEA CHECK (target_event_id IS NULL OR length(target_event_id) = 32),
    target_pubkey       BYTEA CHECK (target_pubkey IS NULL OR length(target_pubkey) = 32),
    target_blob_sha256  BYTEA CHECK (target_blob_sha256 IS NULL OR length(target_blob_sha256) = 32),
    -- Channel inferred from an in-tenant target event row, when resolvable.
    channel_id          UUID,
    -- NIP-56 report type: illegal|nudity|malware|spam|impersonation|profanity|other.
    report_type         TEXT NOT NULL,
    -- Reporter's optional free-text context (mod-queue-only; never public).
    note                TEXT,
    status              TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'open'
                        CHECK (status IN ('open', 'resolved', 'dismissed', 'escalated')),
    resolved_by         BYTEA,
    resolved_at         TIMESTAMPTZ,
    -- moderation_actions row that resolved this report, if any.
    action_id           UUID,
    created_at          TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
    PRIMARY KEY (community_id, id),
    -- Exactly one target class per row: target_kind is authoritative and the
    -- matching column (only) is populated. Queue/action code never guesses.
    CHECK (
        (target_kind = 'event'  AND target_event_id IS NOT NULL AND target_pubkey IS NULL     AND target_blob_sha256 IS NULL) OR
        (target_kind = 'pubkey' AND target_event_id IS NULL     AND target_pubkey IS NOT NULL AND target_blob_sha256 IS NULL) OR
        (target_kind = 'blob'   AND target_event_id IS NULL     AND target_pubkey IS NULL     AND target_blob_sha256 IS NOT NULL)
    ),
    -- Same-community channel provenance (channels are soft-deleted, never
    -- hard-deleted, so this FK cannot dangle).
    FOREIGN KEY (community_id, channel_id) REFERENCES channels (community_id, id)
);

-- Queue reads: open reports, newest first, per community.
CREATE INDEX idx_moderation_reports_status
    ON moderation_reports (community_id, status, created_at DESC);
-- Group-by-target for triage aggregation.
CREATE INDEX idx_moderation_reports_target_event
    ON moderation_reports (community_id, target_event_id)
    WHERE target_event_id IS NOT NULL;
CREATE INDEX idx_moderation_reports_target_pubkey
    ON moderation_reports (community_id, target_pubkey)
    WHERE target_pubkey IS NOT NULL;
-- Idempotency: one row per report event per community.
CREATE UNIQUE INDEX idx_moderation_reports_event
    ON moderation_reports (community_id, report_event_id);

-- ── Bans + timeouts (one restriction row per member) ──────────────────────────
-- Ban = connection block, enforced at the NIP-42 auth seam
-- ("blocked: you are banned from this community") + join/ingest surfaces.
-- Timeout = write-block only ("restricted: you are timed out until <ts>").
-- A row may be ban-only, timeout-only, or both over its lifetime.

CREATE TABLE community_bans (
    community_id    UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
    pubkey          BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (length(pubkey) = 32),
    banned          BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT false,
    -- NULL + banned=true ⇒ permanent.
    ban_expires_at  TIMESTAMPTZ,
    ban_reason      TEXT,
    -- Write-block until this timestamp; NULL or past ⇒ not timed out.
    muted_until     TIMESTAMPTZ,
    mute_reason     TEXT,
    -- Moderator who last modified this row.
    actor_pubkey    BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (length(actor_pubkey) = 32),
    created_at      TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
    updated_at      TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
    PRIMARY KEY (community_id, pubkey)
);

-- ── Moderation audit ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-- One row per accepted moderation action. Full detail (reporter identities,
-- private reasons, matched NIP-OA principal) stays mod/audit-only; the public
-- tombstone carries only action_id + reason_code + sanitized public_reason.

CREATE TABLE moderation_actions (
    community_id    UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES communities(id),
    id              UUID NOT NULL DEFAULT gen_random_uuid(),
    actor_pubkey    BYTEA NOT NULL CHECK (length(actor_pubkey) = 32),
    action          TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (action IN (
                        'delete_message', 'kick', 'ban', 'unban',
                        'timeout', 'untimeout', 'dismiss_report', 'escalate',
                        'resolve:delete', 'resolve:kick', 'resolve:ban',
                        'resolve:timeout')),
    target_pubkey   BYTEA CHECK (target_pubkey IS NULL OR length(target_pubkey) = 32),
    target_event_id BYTEA CHECK (target_event_id IS NULL OR length(target_event_id) = 32),
    channel_id      UUID,
    -- Machine-readable rule/reason code (e.g. "spam", "community_rule_3").
    reason_code     TEXT,
    -- Sanitized, safe for the public tombstone.
    public_reason   TEXT,
    -- Mod-only context; never leaves the audit surface.
    private_reason  TEXT,
    -- NIP-OA: which principal matched a ban ('self' | 'owner'); audit-only,
    -- the client never learns which.
    matched_principal TEXT CHECK (matched_principal IS NULL OR matched_principal IN ('self', 'owner')),
    created_at      TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
    PRIMARY KEY (community_id, id),
    FOREIGN KEY (community_id, channel_id) REFERENCES channels (community_id, id)
);

CREATE INDEX idx_moderation_actions_created
    ON moderation_actions (community_id, created_at DESC);
CREATE INDEX idx_moderation_actions_target_pubkey
    ON moderation_actions (community_id, target_pubkey)
    WHERE target_pubkey IS NOT NULL;

-- Same-community resolution provenance: a report can only be resolved by an
-- action row in its own community. Added after moderation_actions exists.
ALTER TABLE moderation_reports
    ADD FOREIGN KEY (community_id, action_id)
    REFERENCES moderation_actions (community_id, id);